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Abstract—Attracted by the inherent security and privacy pro-
tection of the blockchain, incorporating blockchain into Internet
of Things (IoT) has been widely studied in these years. However,
the mining process requires high computational power, which
prevents IoT devices from directly participating in blockchain
construction. For this reason, edge computing service is intro-
duced to help build the IoT blockchain, where IoT devices could
purchase computational resources from the edge servers. In this
paper, we consider the case that IoT devices also have other
tasks that need the help of edge servers, such as data analysis
and data storage. The profits they can get from these tasks is
closely related to the amounts of resources they purchased from
the edge servers. In this scenario, IoT devices will allocate their
limited budgets to purchase different resources from different
edge servers, such that their profits can be maximized. Moreover,
edge servers will set “best” prices such that they can get the
biggest benefits. Accordingly, there raise a pricing and budget
allocation problem between edge servers and IoT devices. We
model the interaction between edge servers and IoT devices as a
multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game, whose objective
is to reach the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE). We prove the
existence and uniqueness of the SE point, and design efficient
algorithms to reach the SE point. In the end, we verify our
model and algorithms by performing extensive simulations, and
the results show the correctness and effectiveness of our designs.
Index Terms—Internet of things, Blockchain, Edge computing,
Stackelberg game.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few decades, the Internet of Things (IoT) has
been greatly developed and attracted more and more attention
in academia and industry. The IoT technology helps integrate
data by connecting different types of devices and has played an
irreplaceable role in many fields, such as smart homes, smart
factories, smart grids, and so on. In the traditional centralized
IoT system, all IoT devices are connected to a centralized
cloud server, which is used to manage devices and coordinate
communications among devices. The most serious drawback
of this centralized architecture is that it faces many problems,
such as single point of failure, poor scalability, and network
congestion [1]. Some studies introduce distributed IoT [2] and
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peer-to-peer (P2P) networks [3] to overcome these problems.
However, the above studies didn’t solve the inherent threats
and vulnerabilities of the IoT, such as security and privacy
issues [4].
A very effective way to solve the above issues is to in-
corporate blockchain into IoT [5]. The blockchain technology
has been widely used since it was first implemented for
Bitcoin in 2009 [6]. Blockchain records data as a decentralized
public ledger, it does not require a third party server to store
the data. Instead, data are stored in the form of blocks and
maintained by all of the members of the blockchain network.
The distributed feature allows blockchain to avoid suffering
single point of failure which may happen in centralized
systems. The blocks are linked by cryptography, and thus
any change in a block will affect the subsequent blocks. The
security of a blockchain mainly comes from the way that a
new block is generated, which is called mining. To generate
a new block, the members of the blockchain network need to
win the competition of solving a hash puzzle which is very
computation-consuming, and the winner will get a reward from
the blockchain network platform. In this paper, we consider
that the IoT blockchain network adopts the Proof-of-Work
(PoW) consensus mechanism. It is worth mentioning that some
researchers have proposed a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)
based blockchain which is known as tangle for lightweight
IoT applications, such as IoTA [7]. However, the DAG-based
blockchain has many vulnerabilities, such as it facing the
threats of denial of service attacks and spam attacks [8], and
it’s vulnerable to double-spending attacks [9]. Therefore, we
do not adopt the DAG-based blockchain in this paper.
As mentioned before, solving the hash puzzle is
computation-consuming, so it’s hard for the lightweight IoT
devices to participate in the mining process. Fortunately, edge
computing service is helpful for establishing an IoT blockchain
[10], where IoT devices could purchase computational power
from edge servers. Consider such an IoT blockchain network
that contains lots of IoT systems such as smart factories
or smart homes. Each IoT system can be seen as a group,
and all of the groups together maintain the operation of the
blockchain. The IoT blockchain network will attract nearby
IoT systems to join in it due to its security and privacy pro-
tection. Motivated by the reward from the blockchain network
platform, the IoT devices in an IoT system will purchase the
computational resource from the edge server which provides
hash computing service (hash-server) to participate in the
mining process. In addition, these IoT devices may have other
tasks that require the help of the edge server which provides
task processing service (task-server). For example, IoT devices
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that used for building smart cities or realizing augmented
reality (AR) need to store and process large amounts of data
[11], which is very difficult for lightweight IoT devices to
accomplish. Thus it’s necessary for these devices to purchase
resources from the task-server, so that they can perform their
tasks with the help of the task-server. Generally, the more
resources they purchase, the faster and better they perform
their tasks, and the more profits they could get from the
tasks. As IoT devices usually have limited budgets, how to
allocate the budgets to purchase different resources from the
two kind of servers so as to maximize the profits, therefore,
is an important problem for these IoT devices.
Driven by profit, edge servers will set the unit price of their
resources to maximize their utilities, and accordingly, there
raise a pricing and budget allocation problem between edge
servers and IoT devices, We model the interaction between
edge servers and IoT devices as a multi-leader multi-follower
Stackelberg game, where edge servers are leaders and IoT
devices are followers. The main contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows.
• We introduce the IoT blockchain network with edge com-
puting, and describe the operation of the IoT blockchain
system.
• We establish a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg
game to model the interaction between edge servers and
IoT devices. We prove that the Stackelberg equilibrium
of the game exists and is unique, and then propose
algorithms to find the Stackelberg equilibrium in limited
interactions.
• We perform extensive simulations to validate the fea-
sibility and effectiveness of our proposed algorithms,
simulation results show that our algorithms can quickly
reach the unique Stackelberg equilibrium point.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section
II introduces the related works. Section III describes the
IoT blockchain with edge computing. Section IV presents
the Stackelberg game. Section V designs algorithms to get
the Stackelberg equilibrium. Section VI performs numerical
simulations. And finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Due to the inherent security and privacy protection prop-
erties of the blockchain, incorporating blockchain technology
into IoT has been widely studied in recent years. Novo [12]
design an architecture for scalable access management in IoT
based on blockchain technology. To address the privacy and
security issues in the smart grid, Gai et al. [13] present a
permissioned blockchain edge model by combing blockchain
and edge computing technologies. Guo et al. [14] design a
blockchain-enabled energy management system to ensure the
security of energy trading between the power grid and energy
stations. Li et al. [15] propose a resource optimization for
delay-tolerant data in blockchain-enabled IoT, they use the
blockchain technology to improve the data security and effi-
ciency in the IoT system. Liu et al. [16] propose a blockchain-
based approach for the data provenance in IoT, which ensures
the correctness and integrity of the query results. Qi et al. [17]
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Fig. 1. The architecture of the IoT blockchain with edge computing.
build a compressed and data sharing framework with the help
of blockchain technology, which provides efficient and private
data management for industrial IoT. Lei et al. [18] design
the groupchain which is a two-chain structured blockchain to
ensure the scalability of the IoT services with fog computing.
There are some works that use the Stackelberg game to
study the interaction among the participators in the edge
computing-based blockchain network, which are closely re-
lated to our work. Chang et al. [19] study the incentive
mechanism for edge computing-based blockchain networks, in
which they aim to find the Stackelberg equilibrium between
the edge service provider and the miners. Yao et al. [20]
use a Stackelberg game to model the pricing and resource
trading problem between the cloud provider and industrial
IoT devices, and they find the near-optimal policy through
a multiagent reinforcement learning algorithm. Xiong et al.
[21], [22] formulate a Stackelberg game to jointly maximize
the profit of mobile devices and the edge server in mobile
blockchain networks. Ding et al. [23] investigate the interac-
tion between the blockchain platform and IoT devices, where
their objective is to find the Stackelberg equilibrium such that
both the blockchain platform and IoT devices could maximize
their utility and profits respectively. Guo et al. [24] study a
Stackelberg game and double auction based task offloading
scheme for mobile blockchain. However, all of these existing
works only considered the computational power demand of
IoT devices, and the game models in these works only have
one leader, which is fundamentally different from our work.
III. IOT BLOCKCHAIN WITH EDGE COMPUTING
In this section, we introduce the model of the IoT
blockchain with edge computing, and describe the operation
of the blockchain system. Moreover, we analyze the security
and reliability of the IoT blockchain network.
A. System Model
Fig. 1 depicts the architecture of the system model of this
paper. Consider that there is an IoT blockchain network that
has been running for a period which adopts the proof-of-work
consensus mechanism. The IoT blockchain network consists
of lots of IoT systems such as smart factories or smart homes.
Each IoT system includes a set of IoT devices and can be
seen as a group. Due to the security and privacy protection
brought by the blockchain, the IoT blockchain network will
continuously attract other IoT systems to join.
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In each IoT system, there are two edge servers which pro-
vide hash computing service (hash-server) and task processing
service (task-server), respectively. Motivated by the reward
from the blockchain network platform, devices in the IoT
system would like to be miners of the blockchain network,
that is, they will compete with other miners to scramble the
right of generating a new block by solving a hash puzzle.
Due to the limited computational power of these devices,
they will purchase computational resources from the hash-
server and then offload their hash puzzle to the hash-server
during the mining process. Moreover, each IoT device has
its own tasks, such as data collecting, data analysis, and data
processing. IoT devices could benefit from performing these
tasks. However, when the amount of data is relatively large,
it is difficult for these IoT devices to perform the tasks. Then
IoT devices will purchase task processing resources from the
task-server to perform their tasks. Generally, the more resource
they purchase, the faster and better they perform their tasks,
and then the more benefit they get from these tasks.
B. Blockchain System
1) System Initialization: Before each IoT device joins in
the blockchain network, it needs to register with the Authen-
tication Server (AS) which is authorized by the blockchain
platform. The process is as follows. A device sn first selects
its own identifier IDn, and then generate its public/private
key pair (PKn, SKn) with Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) asymmetric cryptography [25]. The pub-
lic key is opened to the whole blockchain network, and the
private key is only known by the device itself. To avoid public
key replacement attacks, each IoT device sn needs to get its
digital certificate Certn from the Certificate Authority (CA).
The digital certificate Certn is generated by CA’s private
key SKca with sn’s identifier IDn and public key PKn,
i.e., Certn = SKca(IDn, PKn). CA send the encrypted
message m = PKn(Certn) to sn, and sn decrypt the
message with its private key to get its digital certificate, that is,
Certn = SKn(m). The digital certificate is used to uniquely
identify the IoT device. After gets its digital certificate,
the device sn submits its registration information regn =
PKas(IDn, PKn, Certn) to the AS. Upon receiving regn,
AS get the registration information by decrypting regn with
its private key (IDn, PKn, Certn) = SKas(regn). Then AS
check the identity of sn, if (IDn, PKn) = PKca(Certn),
sn passes the authentication. Device sn gets its wallet address
WADn from AS, which is generated from its public key with
SHA256, RIPEMD-160 and BASE58 algorithms [26]. The AS
will store the information (IDn, PKn, Certn,WADn) about
IoT device sn.
2) Create Transactions: In the IoT blockchain network,
devices can trading with each other, and purchase or exchange
sensing data with each other. For example, a device sn wants
to purchase the sensing data from sm, sn first generate a
request req = {IDn||WADn||DataMesn||Tstamp}, where
DataMesn is the description of its request and Tstamp is the
timestamp of the message. Then sn signs the request message
with its private key SKn and digital certificate Certn to prove
its identity, Sreq = {req||SignSKn(Hash(req))||Certn}.
At last, sn encrypt the message with sm’s public key
EncSreq = PKm(Sreq), and sent the message EncSreq
to sm. Upon receiving the message, sm first decrypt the
message with its private key Sreq = SKm(EncSreq).
Then check the signature and digital certificate of sn. If
Hash(req) = PKn(SignSKn(Hash(req))), it can make
sure that the message is sent by sn. The digital certificate
is used to validate the authenticity of the signature. sm use
CA’s public key to decrypt the digital certificate Certn, if
(IDn, PKn) = PK
ca(Certn), it’s known that the signature
is signed by sn. Then sm will send a response message to
sn, similar to the above process, all the messages between
sn and sm are sent in an encrypted way. After finish the
trading, sn will broadcast their trading record to the blockchain
network, and waiting to be stored in the blockchain. Besides
the trading information between devices, some devices may
want to store the sensing data which is important and sensitive
into blockchain. Both the trading records and sensing data are
considered as transactions.
3) Building Blocks: IoT devices collect a certain number
of transactions in a period, and package them into a block.
Each block is composed of two parts: block content and block
header. The block content records the detail of transactions
in a Merkle tree structure. The block header consists of the
previous block hash value, which is used as a cryptographic
link that creates the chain, a version number that used for
tracking for software or protocol updates, a timestamp that
records the time at which the block is generated, a Merkle
tree root of all the transactions, a hash threshold value that
records the current mining difficulty, and a nonce, which is
used for solving the PoW puzzle. The mining process is similar
to that in the Bitcoin system. Denoted hdata by the block
header excludes the nonce, then the mining process is to find
a nonce a such that Hash(hdata+a) < difficulty [6], where
difficulty is a 256-bits binary number and is controlled by
the blockchain platform to adjust the block generation speed.
As the hash operation is very costly, the hash task of each IoT
device will be offloaded to the hash-server, and each device
is only responsible for generating new blocks after receiving
the result from the hash-server.
4) Carrying Out Consensus Process: The device who first
solves the PoW puzzle gets the right to generate a new block,
and then the new block needs to be verified by other devices.
By adopting the group signature and authentication scheme
proposed in [27], each IoT system in the blockchain network
can be seen as a group. For a new block which is generated
by a device in group i, it needs to pass a two-round validation
before to be added in the blockchain. In the first round, the
block is checked by the devices in group i, each device will
validate the transactions recorded in this block. The block
will get a signature if it passes the validation from a device,
and it can be broadcast to other groups for a second round
validation only if it gets all the signatures of devices in group
i. In the second round, upon receiving the block, devices in
other groups only check the signature attached in the block.
If more than 50% of the devices agreed with the block, the
block will be added into the blockchain. Due to the constraints
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in memory, we let each IoT device only stores a certain
number of the latest blocks, which is also applied in [28],
[29]. The whole blockchain is stored in the monitoring nodes
[29] in each group (IoT system), as the monitoring nodes are
authoritative and have larger memory capacity.
C. Security and Reliability Analysis
Different from traditional IoT systems, merging the IoT
system into a blockchain network has many advantages, espe-
cially in terms of security and reliability. Specifically, the IoT
blockchain network with edge computing inherits the security
and reliability performance of the blockchain, as shown in
follows.
1) Get rid of a third party: IoT devices carry out transac-
tions in a P2P manner, in which each device has the same
rights, and the trust between devices is built with the
help of the smart contract of the blockchain. Therefore,
the IoT blockchain network guarantees the robustness
and scalability without involving a trusted third party.
2) Privacy protection: Blockchain can help deal with the
increasing risk of sensitive data being exposed to mal-
wares. In the blockchain network, the communication
between devices uses the asymmetric encryption tech-
nology to protect the sensitive data. The message sent
to a device will be encrypted with the receiver’s public
key, and it can only be decrypted by the receiver’s private
key. In this way, even if malicious devices intercept the
message, they cannot know the content of the message.
3) Integrity: The blocks are duplicated recorded in different
devices in a distributed way, so it’s very hard for
attackers to tamper with the blockchain. Besides, the
blocks are linked together through cryptography. If an
attacker attempts to tamper with the transactions in a
block, the hash value of each subsequent block will
be changed, and thus the attacker needs to redo the
PoW puzzle of each subsequent block, which is nearly
impossible for the attackers.
4) Authentication: In this IoT blockchain network, each
new block needs to pass a two-round validation before
it is added into the blockchain. It’s very hard for an
attacker to control a whole group (IoT system), so the
new block that contains illegal transactions cannot pass
the first round validation. Even if some attackers forge
the signature of a group, the illegal block cannot pass
the second round validation.
IV. MULTI-LEADER MULTI-FOLLOWER STACKELBERG
GAME
Consider that a new IoT system now join in the IoT
blockchain network, the IoT devices in this system will
purchase resources from the edge servers to participate in the
mining process and perform their tasks. Driven by profit, the
hash-server and task-server will adjust the unit price of their
resources to maximize their utilities. After the two servers
publish their pricing strategies, each IoT device will determine
its strategy for purchasing resources from the two servers
according to the resource price and their budgets, such that
their profits can be maximized. In this section, we first give
the utility functions of the two servers and the profit function
of each device, and then describe the problem to be addressed
in this paper, specifically, we model the interaction between the
two servers and IoT devices as a multi-leader multi-follower
Stackelberg game.
A. Utility Function
We assume that each IoT device has a unique budget
to purchase resources from edge servers. The amount of
resources they purchase from the two edge servers depends on
how many profits they can get from the trading and are limited
by their budgets. Each IoT device will allocate their budget
to purchase different services from the hash-server and the
task-server to maximize their profits. For the hash-server and
the task-server, they will set the unit price of their resources
to maximize their utilities. Moreover, there is a competition
between the two servers. For example, if the unit price of
resources from hash-server is too high, IoT devices would
purchase more resources from the task-server, and vice versa.
Naturally, we model the interaction between the two servers
and IoT devices as a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg
game, where the hash-server and the task-server act as leaders
who first set the unit price of their resources, and IoT devices
act as followers who determine their strategies according to
the leaders’ bids.
We use S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} to denote the set of IoT
devices, the budget for each device si ∈ S to purchase
resources is bi where bi > 0. The unit price of resources from
the hash-server and the task-server are denoted by ph and pt
per day, respectively. Let xhi and x
t
i be the amount of resources
purchased by si from the hash-server and the task-server, re-
spectively. The amount of resources purchased buy each device
is limited by its budget, that is, xhi ∗ph+xti ∗pt ≤ bi,∀si ∈ S.
The profits of each IoT device si ∈ S includes two
parts. The first part comes from mining new blocks for
the blockchain network, which is related to the amount of
resources xhi purchased by si from the hash-server. The
second part comes from performing tasks, which is related
to the amount of resources xti purchased by si from the
task-server. We use Phi and P
t
i to denote the two parts of
profits, respectively. In the following, we will describe how to
calculate the two parts of profits.
As the blockchain network has been running for a period,
in this paper, we assume that the total hash computational
power of the blockchain network in a period time in the
future can be estimated and is denoted by H . In the PoW
consensus, the first miner who solves the hash puzzle has
the right to generate a new block and will get the reward
from the blockchain network. The probability of a miner
winning the mining competition is directly related to the hash
computational power. We use proi to denote the probability
that device si ∈ S is the first one to solve the hash puzzle,
and proi can be estimated by
proi =
xhi
H + xhi
. (1)
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Generally, the blockchain network will adjust the difficulty
of the hash puzzle periodically according to the total hash
computation power in the network to stabilize the block
generation speed. We assume that an average of N new blocks
are generated per day, and the miners will get a reward R
for generating a new block. The expected reward obtained by
device si in per day is proiRN , and the cost is xhi ph. Then
the expected profits that si gets from the mining process in a
day is calculated as
Phi = proiRN − xhi ph. (2)
The profits P ti got by si comes from performing tasks is
related to the amount of resources purchased by si from the
task server, we use a logarithmic function to estimate the
benefits of device si for performing tasks, and then P ti is
calculated as
P ti = α log(1 + βx
t
i)− xtipt, (3)
where α > 0 and β ≥ 1 are two constant parameters.
Therefore, the total profits got by device si is calculated as
Pi = P
h
i + P
t
i
= RN
xhi
H + xhi
− xhi ph + α log(1 + βxti)− xtipt.
(4)
We use Uh and Ut to denote the utility of the hash-
server and task-server, respectively. Assume that the unit hash
resource cost of the hash-server is ch, and the unit task
resource cost of the task-server is ct. Then the utilities of the
two servers can be calculated as
Uh =
∑
si∈S
(ph − ch)xhi , (5)
Ut =
∑
si∈S
(pt − ct)xti. (6)
The profits Pi gots by device si involves two parts, i.e.,
Phi and P
t
i , which comes from trading with the two servers,
respectively. The first-order derivatives of Phi and P
t
i are
∂Phi
∂xhi
= RN
H
(H + xhi )
2
− ph, (7)
∂P ti
∂xti
=
αβ
1 + βxti
− pt. (8)
To make the problem reasonable, the conditions ∂P
h
i
∂xhi
(0) ≥ 0
and ∂P
t
i
∂xti
(0) ≥ 0 should be hold, otherwise, IoT devices will
never purchase resources from the hash-server or the task-
server. Hence, we have ph ≤ RNH and pt ≤ αβ. As servers
will never sell their resources at a price below the cost, that
is, ph ≥ ch and pt ≥ ct. Therefore, in this paper, we assume
that ch ≤ ph ≤ RNH and ct ≤ pt ≤ αβ.
B. Problem Formulation
The interaction between the two servers and IoT devices has
two stages. In the upper stage, the hash-server and the task-
server offer a unit price of their resources. In the lower stage,
IoT devices determine their strategies to maximize their profits
according to the price of different services. In the following,
we give a detailed definition of the problem in each stage.
Problem 1. The problem in the lower stage (followers side).
max
xhi ,x
t
i
Pi (9)
s.t. xhi ph + x
t
ipt ≤ bi, (10)
xhi ≥ 0, xti ≥ 0. (11)
Problem 2. The problem in the upper stage (leaders side).
max
ph
Uh (12)
s.t. ch ≤ ph ≤ RN
H
, (13)
and
max
pt
Ut (14)
s.t. ct ≤ pt ≤ αβ. (15)
Note that in the lower stage, each IoT device make their
decision independently, and in the upper stage, the two servers
are also non-cooperative. Therefore, the problems in the two
stages form a non-cooperative multi-leader multi-follower
Stackelberg game. Our objective is to find the Stackelberg
equilibrium (SE) point of the game, where none of the players
of the game wants to change its strategy unilaterally. The SE
point in our model is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Let x∗i = {xh∗i , xt∗i } be a strategy of IoT device
si, and we use X∗ = {x∗1,x∗2, . . . ,x∗n} to denote the set
of strategies of all of the IoT devices. Let p∗h and p
∗
t be the
strategies of the hash-server and the task-server, respectively.
The point (X∗, p∗h, p
∗
t ) is the Stackelberg equilibrium point if
the following conditions are satisfied.
Pi(x
∗
i , p
∗
h, p
∗
t ) ≥ Pi(xi, p∗h, p∗t ),∀si ∈ S, (16)
Uh(p
∗
h, p
∗
t ) ≥ Uh(ph, p∗t ), (17)
Ut(p
∗
t , p
∗
h) ≥ Ut(pt, p∗h), (18)
where xi = {xhi , xti} is an arbitrary feasible strategy for any
device si ∈ S , ph and pt are arbitrary feasible strategies for
the hash-server and the task-server, respectively.
V. SOLUTION OF THE MULTI-LEADER MULTI-FOLLOWER
STACKELBERG GAME
In this section, we analyze the existence and uniqueness
of the Stackelberg equilibrium point of the multi-leader multi-
follower Stackelberg game. We first analyze the lower stage of
the game, where each follower purchases different resources
from the two servers with a limited budget to maximize its
profits. Then we analyze the upper stage of the game, where
the two servers determine their pricing strategies to maximize
their utilities.
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A. Lower stage (followers side) analysis
The second-order derivatives of the profits function Pi of
device si are
∂2Pi
∂(xhi )
2
=
−2RN
(H + xhi )
3
< 0, (19)
∂2Pi
∂(xti)
2
=
−αβ2
(1 + βxti)
2
< 0, (20)
∂2Pi
∂xhi ∂x
t
i
= 0. (21)
Therefore, the profits function Pi is strictly concave, and the
problem for each device si in the lower stage is actually
a convex optimization problem. Sequentially, we use the
KarushKuhnTucker (KKT) conditions to solve the problem.
Let λ1, λ2 and λ3 be the Lagrange’s multipliers that asso-
ciated with conditions in Eqs. (10) and (11). Then we define
the Lagrangian function as follows.
Li = Pi + λ1(bi − xhi ph − xtipt) + λ2xhi + λ3xti. (22)
The KKT conditions (including four group of conditions)
of Problem 1 are listed as follows.
Stationarity conditions:
∂Li
∂xhi
= RN
H
(H + xhi )
2
− ph − λ1ph + λ2 = 0, (23)
∂Li
∂xti
=
αβ
1 + βxti
− pt − λ1pt + λ3 = 0. (24)
Primal feasibility conditions:
bi − xhi ph − xtipt ≥ 0, (25)
xhi , x
t
i ≥ 0. (26)
Dual feasibility conditions:
λ1, λ2, λ3 ≥ 0. (27)
Complementary slackness conditions:
λ1(bi − xhi ph − xtipt) = 0, (28)
λ2x
h
i = 0, (29)
λ3x
t
i = 0. (30)
The optimal solution of the problem is taken in one of the
following four cases.
(1) Case 1: xhi = x
t
i = 0. According to the KKT condition
(28), we have λ1 = 0 as bi > 0. Substitute it into KKT
conditions (23) and (24), we have λ2 = ph − RNH and λ3 =
pt − αβ. As ph ≤ RNH and pt ≤ αβ hold, we have λ2 ≤ 0
and λ3 ≤ 0. The KKT conditions can be satisfied only when
λ2 = 0 and λ3 = 0. Thus we need to check whether ph = RNH
and pt = αβ hold, if yes, the optimal solution is xhi = x
t
i = 0,
otherwise, the optimal solution is not in this case.
(2) Case 2: xhi = 0 and x
t
i > 0. In this case, we have
λ3 = 0 according to the KKT condition (30).
Consider λ1 = 0, substitute xhi = 0 and λ1 = 0 into (23),
we have λ2 = ph− RNH ≤ 0. If ph < RNH , the KKT condition
(27) cannot be satisfied as λ2 < 0, which means λ1 = 0 is not
feasible in this case. Otherwise, if ph = RNH , we have λ2 = 0.
Substitute λ1 = λ3 = 0 into (24), we have xti =
α
pt
− 1β . Then
we need to check whether the primal feasibility condition (25)
is satisfied, if yes, the optimal solution is (0, αpt − 1β ), if no,
λ1 = 0 is not feasible in this case.
Consider λ1 > 0, according to (28), we have bi − xhi ph −
xtipt = 0. Combing x
h
i = 0, we have
xti =
bi
pt
. (31)
Substitute (31) and λ3 = 0 into KKT condition (24), we have
λ1 =
αβ
βbi + pt
− 1. (32)
Substitute (32) and xhi = 0 into (23), we have
λ2 =
αβph
βbi + pt
− RN
H
. (33)
It obvious that xti =
bi
pt
> 0 is satisfied. If λ1 got by (32)
satisfies λ1 > 0 and λ2 got by (33) satisfies λ2 ≥ 0, it means
all of the KKT conditions can be satisfied, and thus the optimal
solution can be determined as (0, bipt ). Otherwise, the optimal
solution is not in Case 2.
(3) Case 3: xhi > 0 and x
t
i = 0. In this case, we have
λ2 = 0 according to the KKT condition (29).
Consider λ1 = 0, substitute xti = 0 and λ1 = 0 into (24), we
have λ3 = pt − αβ ≤ 0. If pt < αβ, the KKT condition (27)
cannot be satisfied as λ3 < 0, which implies λ1 = 0 in not
feasible in this case. Otherwise, if pt = αβ, we have λ3 = 0.
Substitute λ1 = λ2 = 0 into (23), we have xhi =
√
RNH
ph
−H .
Then we need to check whether the primal feasibility condition
(25) is satisfied, if yes, the optimal solution is (
√
RNH
ph
−H, 0),
if no, λ1 = 0 is not feasible in this case.
Consider λ1 > 0, we have bi − xhi ph − xtipt = 0 according
to (28). Combing xti = 0, we have
xhi =
bi
ph
. (34)
Substitute (34) and λ2 = 0 into KKT condition (23), we have
λ1 =
RNHph
(bi +Hph)2
− 1. (35)
Substitute (35) and xti = 0 into (24), we have
λ3 =
RNHphpt
(bi +Hph)2
− αβ. (36)
It’s obvious that xhi =
bi
ph
> 0 is satisfied. If λ1 got by (35)
satisfies λ1 > 0 and λ3 got by (36) satisfies λ3 ≥ 0, it means
that all of the KKT conditions can be satisfied, and thus the
optimal solution is ( biph , 0). Otherwise, the optimal solution is
not in Case 3.
(4) Case 4: xhi > 0 and x
t
i > 0. In this case, we have
λ2 = λ3 = 0 according to the KKT conditions (29) and (30).
Suppose λ1 = 0, substitute it into the stationarity conditions
(23) and (24), we have
xhi =
√
RNH
ph
−H;xti =
α
pt
− 1
β
. (37)
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As ph ≤ RNH and pt ≤ αβ, it’s easy to know that the condition
(26) is satisfied. Then we check whether the condition (25) is
satisfied. If yes, then the solution shown in Eq. (37) is the
optimal solution. Otherwise, λ1 = 0 is not feasible in this
case.
Now we consider the case that λ1 > 0. According to
the condition (28), we have bi − xhi ph − xtipt = 0. Solving
conditions (23) and (24), we have
xhi =
√
RNH
ph + λ1ph
−H;xti =
α
pt + λ1pt
− 1
β
. (38)
Substitute (38) into bi − xhi ph − xtipt = 0, we have
A−B
√
1
1 + λ1
− α
1 + λ1
= 0. (39)
where A = bi + Hph + 1β pt > 0, and B =
√
RNHph > 0.
Let t =
√
1 + λ1 > 0, substitute t into (39) and solve the
function, we have t = B±
√
B2+4Aα
2A . As t > 0, we have
t =
√
1 + λ1 =
B +
√
B2 + 4Aα
2A
. (40)
By solving (40), we have
λ1 =
(
B +
√
B2 + 4Aα
2A
)2
− 1. (41)
Then we check whether λ1 got by (41) satisfies λ1 > 0. If
λ1 ≤ 0, it means that the solutions found in (38) cannot satisfy
all of the KKT conditions, and thus the optimal solution is not
in Case 4. Otherwise, we substitute (41) into (38), and we will
get a solution (xhi , x
t
i). Then we check whether the solution
(xhi , x
t
i) satisfies x
h
i > 0 and x
t
i > 0. If yes, the solution
(xhi , x
t
i) is the optimal solution. If no, the optimal solution is
not in Case 4.
The optimal solution will be found in one of the four cases
from Case 1 to Case 4. Based on above analysis, we present
the algorithm FOSD to solve Problem 1 in the lower stage.
The pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 1.
B. Upper stage (leaders side) analysis
On the leaders’ side, hash-server and task-server set their
unit prices ph and pt of resources to maximize their utilities Uh
and Ut which are calculated by Eqs. (5) and (6), respectively.
Note that the pricing strategies of leaders will directly affect
the strategies of followers, which has been analyzed in Section
V-A. Therefore, the strategies of the hash-server and task-
server will affect each other’s utility. The game between the
two servers is non-cooperative and competitive. To maximize
their utilities, each server (leader) should give a suitable unit
price of its resource. For example, for the hash-server, if the
unit price of resource ph is too high, the followers will prefer
to purchase more resources from the task-server, and thus the
hash-server will get a very low utility. On the contrary, if ph is
set too low, although the followers tend to purchase resources
from the hash-server, the total purchased resources are limited
due to the budget limitation of these followers, which also
results in a low utility. In the following, we will show that the
Algorithm 1 Find Optimal Strategy for a Device si. (FOSD)
Input: H, R, N, α, β, bi, ph and pt;
Output: The optimal strategy (xhi , xti) for IoT device si;
// Case 1:
1: if ph = RNH && pt = αβ then
2: return (0, 0);
3: end if
// Case 2-1:
4: xti =
α
pt
− 1β ;
5: if ph = RNH && bi − xtipt ≥ 0 then
6: return (0, xti);
7: end if
// Case 2-2:
8: xti =
bi
pt
; λ1 = αββbi+pt − 1; λ2 =
αβph
βbi+pt
− RNH ;
9: if λ1 > 0 && λ2 ≥ 0 then
10: return (0, xti);
11: end if
// Case 3-1:
12: xhi =
√
RNH
ph
−H;
13: if pt = αβ && bi − xhi ph ≥ 0 then
14: return (xhi , 0);
15: end if
// Case 3-2:
16: xhi =
bi
ph
; λ1 = RNHph(bi+Hph)2 − 1;λ3 =
RNHphpt
(bi+Hph)2
− αβ;
17: if λ1 > 0 && λ3 ≥ 0 then
18: return (xhi , 0);
19: end if
// Case 4-1:
20: xhi =
√
RNH
ph
−H;xti = αpt − 1β ;
21: if bi − xhi ph − xtipt ≥ 0 then
22: return (xhi , xti);
23: end if
// Case 4-2:
24: A = bi +Hph +
1
β pt, B =
√
RNHph;
25: λ1 =
(
B+
√
B2+4Aα
2A
)2
− 1;
26: if λ1 > 0 then
27: xhi =
√
RNH
ph+λ1ph
−H;xti = αpt+λ1pt − 1β ;
28: if xhi > 0 && xti > 0 then
29: return (xhi , xti);
30: end if
31: end if
game between the two servers will reach a Nash equilibrium,
and we design an algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium point.
The concept of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game
between the two servers is defined as follows.
Definition 2. Let p∗h and p∗t be the strategies of the hash-
server and the task-server, respectively, (p∗h, p
∗
t ) is the Nash
equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied.
Uh(p
∗
h, p
∗
t ) ≥ Uh(ph, p∗t ), (42)
Ut(p
∗
t , p
∗
h) ≥ Ut(pt, p∗h), (43)
where ph and pt are arbitrary feasible strategies for the hash-
server and the task-server, respectively.
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According to the definition, at the NE point, none of the
servers can improve its utility by unilaterally changing its
strategy. Therefore, when the game reaches a NE point, the
interaction between the two servers is suspended, and the
pricing strategies of the two servers will never change again.
Next, we will prove the existence and uniqueness of the NE
point of the game between the two servers.
Theorem 1. The NE point of the game between the two servers
exists and is unique.
Proof. As defined in Problem 2, the strategy space of the two
servers is [ch, RHH ]×[ct, αβ], which is a non-empty, closed and
convex subset of the Euclidean space. Next, we calculate the
second order derivatives of utility functions Uh(·) and Ut(·).
We first consider the utility of the hash-server. According
analysis in Section V-A, the amount of purchased resources
xhi of device si from the hash-server must be one of the four
following cases: (1) xhi =
√
RNH
ph
−H; (2) xhi =
√
RNH
ph+λ1ph
−
H , where λ1 = (41); (3) xhi = 0; (4) x
h
i =
bi
ph
. Then the first
order derivative of xhi (·) with respect to ph of this four cases
is calculated as:
∂xhi
∂ph
= −1
2
√
RNH (ph)
− 32 (44)
= −1
2
√
RNH
1 + λ1
(ph)
− 32 , λ1 = (41) (45)
= 0 (46)
= −bi(ph)−2. (47)
The second order derivative of xhi (·) with respect to ph of
this four cases is calculated as:
∂2xhi
∂(ph)2
=
3
4
√
RNH (ph)
− 52 (48)
=
3
4
√
RNH
1 + λ1
(ph)
− 52 , λ1 = (41) (49)
= 0 (50)
= 2bi(ph)
−3. (51)
According to function (5), the second order derivative of
Uh(·) with respect to ph is
∂2Uh
∂(ph)2
=
∑
si∈S
(
2
∂xhi
∂ph
+ (ph − ch) ∂
2xhi
∂(ph)2
)
. (52)
As ph − ch < ph, combing the functions of ∂x
h
i
∂ph
and ∂
2xhi
∂(ph)2
,
we have ∂
2Uh
∂(ph)2
≤ 0. Therefore, the utility function Uh(·) of
the hash-server is a concave function with respect to ph.
Similarly, we have ∂
2Ut
∂(pt)2
≤ 0, and we know that the utility
function Ut(·) of the task-server is a concave function with
respect to pt. Thus the interaction between the two servers
form a concave 2-person game. According to [30], we know
that the NE point of the game between the two servers exists
and is unique.
After the leaders (the two servers) issue their strategies,
the followers (IoT devices) will determine their strategies for
purchasing different resources from the two servers, as is
discussed in Section V-A. The interaction between servers and
IoT devices formulates a multi-leader multi-follower Stackel-
berg game, and the objective is to find the Stackelberg equi-
librium (SE) point of the game, which is defined as Definition
1. Next, we will prove that the Stackelberg equilibrium of the
game between servers and IoT devices exists and is unique.
Theorem 2. The SE point of the game between servers and
IoT devices exists and is unique.
Proof. As analyzed in Section V-A, each IoT device will find
its optimal strategy in one of the three cases from Case 2 to
Case 4, which indicates that the strategy of each IoT device
is unique after the two servers give their pricing strategies.
According to Theorem 1, the game between the two servers
has a unique NE point, we thus can conclude that the SE
point of the game between servers and IoT devices exists and
is unique.
To find the NE point of the game between the two servers,
based on the optimal strategies of IoT devices, we proposed an
algorithm FNES to find the final pricing strategies of the two
servers. The FNES is based on sub-gradient technique [31],
[32], and it invokes FOSD as its subroutine. The pseudo-code
of algorithm FNES is shown in Algorithm 2.
In FNES, we first set a feasible pricing strategy for each
server, and a small step ∆ is set to update the strategies of
servers. We iteratively adjust the pricing strategy for each
server in an alternative way. For the hash-server, we will
calculate its utility Uh with pricing strategies ph, ph + ∆ and
ph −∆, and the best pricing strategy will be selected as the
latest strategy in the next round. Note that, the value of Uh is
related to the strategy of each IoT device, and thus we need
to invoke the FOSD algorithm to get the strategy of each IoT
device. The strategy adjustment of the task-server is similar to
that of the hash-server. In each iteration, we update the step
∆ with the attenuation coefficient δ, where δ ∈ (0, 1). The
FNES terminates when none of the servers will change its
pricing strategy.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we conduct numerical experiments to vali-
date the feasibility and effectiveness of our algorithms.
A. Experimental settings
In the experiments, we assume the total hash computational
power H of the IoT blockchain network in the next period
is estimated to be 1000 GH/s. The mining reward R from
the blockchain platform is set to be 300, and the number of
generated new blocks per day N is set to be 144. For the profit
function of performing tasks, we set α to be 40, and β to be 2.
The unit resource cost of the hash-server and the task-server
is set to be 10, that is, ch = ct = 10. We consider there are
5 IoT devices in the IoT system that would like to purchase
resources from the two servers, the budget of each device is
50, 60, 70, 80, and 90, respectively. For the algorithm FNES,
we set the set ∆ to be 1, and the attenuation coefficient δ to be
0.99. Unless other declared, the above are the default settings
of our experiments.
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Algorithm 2 Find Nash Equilibrium for Servers. (FNES)
Input: The game between the two servers and IoT devices;
Output: The pricing strategy (ph, pt) for the two servers;
1: Initialize: ph = 12 (ch +
RN
H ), pt =
1
2 (ct + αβ);
2: Set a small step ∆, and the attenuation coefficient δ of
the step;
3: while true do
4: p′h = ph, p
′
t = pt;
// Adjust strategy for the hash-server
5: Calculate Uh(ph, pt), Uh(ph + ∆, pt) and Uh(ph −
∆, pt) by invoking Algorithm FOSD for each IoT device
with parameters (ph, pt), (ph + ∆, pt) and (ph −∆, pt),
respectively;
6: if Uh(ph+∆, pt) ≥ Uh(ph, pt) && Uh(ph+∆, pt) ≥
Uh(ph −∆, pt) then
7: ph = min{ph + ∆, RNH };
8: else if Uh(ph − ∆, pt) ≥ Uh(ph, pt) && Uh(ph −
∆, pt) ≥ Uh(ph + ∆, pt) then
9: ph = max{ph −∆, ch};
10: end if
// Adjust strategy for the tash-server
11: Calculate Ut(pt, ph), Ut(pt + ∆, ph) and Ut(pt −
∆, ph) by invoking Algorithm FOSD for each IoT device
with parameters (pt, ph), (pt + ∆, ph) and (pt −∆, ph),
respectively;
12: if Ut(pt + ∆, ph) ≥ Ut(pt, ph) && Ut(pt + ∆, ph) ≥
Ut(pt −∆, ph) then
13: pt = min{pt + ∆, αβ};
14: else if Ut(pt − ∆, ph) ≥ Ut(pt, ph) && Ut(pt −
∆, ph) ≥ Ut(pt + ∆, ph) then
15: pt = max{pt −∆, ct};
16: end if
17: if p′h = ph && p′t = pt then
18: Break;
19: end if
// Reduce the step
20: ∆ = δ ·∆;
21: end while
22: return (ph, pt)
B. Results and Analyses
1) The convergence of algorithm FNES: In algorithm FNES,
we set the default initial value of the pricing strategies
of the two servers as ph = 12 (ch +
RN
H ) = 26.6 and
pt =
1
2 (ct + αβ) = 45. As shown in Fig. 2(a), after 23
iterations, the interaction between the two servers reach the
Nash Equilibrium. However, when we set the initial value of
the pricing strategies of the two servers as ph = RNH = 43.2
and pt = αβ = 80, as shown in Fig. 2(b), it needs about 130
iterations to reach the Nash Equilibrium, which is much slower
than that in Fig. 2(a). This indicates that different initialization
will significantly affect the convergence speed of algorithm
FNES. We can also see that Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) reach
the same Nash Equilibrium even though the initialization is
different, which implies the correctness of our analysis in
Theorem 2.
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Fig. 2. The convergence process of FNES with different initialization.
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Fig. 3. The convergence process of FNES with different ∆.
We investigate the effect of the step ∆ on the convergence
of algorithm FNES in Fig. 3. It can be seen that it needs
more iterations to reach the Nash Equilibrium when we adopt
a smaller ∆. However, although using a larger ∆ can quickly
approach the equilibrium point, we have to wait for more
iterations if we want to get a more accurate solution, as
we need to wait for the step ∆ to decay to a sufficiently
small level. Therefore, how to select a suitable value of ∆
depends on the trade-off between the convergence speed and
solution accuracy. If we care more about the convergence
speed other than the accuracy, we should adopt a relatively
large ∆, otherwise, we should adopt a small ∆. There exists an
alternative way to quickly reach a more accurate equilibrium
point, that is, we use a large ∆ to quickly approach the
equilibrium point, and then set the ∆ to a small value to
improve the accuracy.
2) The effect of the mining reward R: We investigate the
effect of the mining reward R on the final solution of our
problem, as shown in Fig. 4. When the mining reward R
increases from 200 to 400, the miners (IoT devices) will get
more profit from the mining process, and thus these devices
prefer to spend their budget on purchasing hash computational
power. Therefore, the hash-server will give a higher price to
get a larger utility, and the task-server has to lower its price
to attract the devices. The results are shown in Fig. 4(a) and
Fig. 4(b). From Fig. 4(c) we can see that the total purchased
hash resource of devices decreases as the reward R increases.
This is because the price of the hash resource has been raised
up, and the devices have limited budgets. It indicates that if
the blockchain platform wants to attract miners to contribute
more computational power by increasing the mining reward,
it may have an opposite effect. Devices will get more profit
as the mining reward R increases, as shown in Fig. 4(d).
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Fig. 4. The effect of the R on (a) pricing strategies of servers, (b) utilities of servers, (c) total sold resources of servers and (d) total profits of devices.
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Fig. 5. The effect of ch on (a) pricing strategies of servers, (b) utilities of servers, (c) total sold resources of servers and (d) total profits of devices.
3) The effect of the unit resource cost of the servers: We
keep the unit resource cost ct of the task-server unchanged,
and increase the unit resource cost ch of the hash-server from
10 to 20. As the unit resource cost ch raised up, the hash-server
will raise its resource price to get a larger utility. Thus devices
will allocate more budget to purchase resources from the task-
server, and then the task-server will raise its resource price as
it is more competitive. The results are shown in Fig. 5(a). The
total purchased hash resource of devices will decrease due
to the above reasons, meanwhile, devices will purchase more
resource from the task-server, as shown in Fig. 5(c). The utility
of the hash-server decreases with increasing the unit resource
cost ch, the reason is that the total sold resources of the hash-
server decreases as ch increases, even though the price ph
has risen, the value ph − ch almost unchanged. The results
are shown in Fig. 5(b). As both of the two servers will bid
a higher price as ch increases, devices will get less profit,
as shown in Fig. 5(d). From Fig. 5, we can conclude that if
the server could reduce its unit resource cost, it will be more
competitive and thus obtain more benefits.
4) The effect of the budget of devices: If we increase the
budget b5 of device s5 from 50 to 190, while the budgets
of other devices keep unchanged, the profit gets by s5 will
increase because it can purchase more resources from the two
servers, while the profits of other devices decrease, as shown
in Fig. 6(a). The reason is that the increment of the budget b5
will cause servers to raise their resource prices, which in turn
reduced the amount of resources purchased by other devices,
as shown in Fig. 6(b). The result indicates that the budget of
devices will affect each other’s profit in an indirect way.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the pricing and budget allocation
problem between edge servers and IoT devices in an IoT
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Fig. 6. The effect of the budget b5 of device s5.
blockchain network. We first introduce the architecture of IoT
blockchain with edge computing, and describe the operation
of the IoT blockchain system. Then, we model the interac-
tion between edge servers and IoT devices as a multi-leader
multi-follower Stackelberg game. We prove the existence and
uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium, and design efficient
algorithms to get the Stackelberg equilibrium point. Finally,
we validate the correctness and effectiveness of our designs
by conducting extensive simulations.
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